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Of Saving to Suitors, Limitation of
Shipowners' Liability, and the Inherent
Conffict Between
Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal courts have often been faced with the "recurring and inherent
conflict" between the Limitation of Liability Act and the saving to suitors
clause.2 The Limitation of Liability Act allows a shipowner to absolutely limit
its liability, for collisions and other losses which take place without the owner's
privity or knowledge, to the value of the ship and its freight then pending. The
Act also provides for exclusive federal admiralty jurisdiction to determine
whether an owner is entitled to limitation of its liability. The saving to suitors
clause, on the other hand, which is included in the statutory grant of exclusive
admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts, gives claimants the right to pursue
common law remedies in maritime causes of action in state court. One statute
provides for a federal court, the other permits state court actions. The inherent
contradiction of these statutory provisions has produced an ongoing conflict that
courts have struggled to deal with for decades. In Lewis v. Lewis & Clark
Marine, Inc., the Supreme Court reiterated that a claimant should be allowed to
pursue an action in state court so long as the shipowner's right to limitation of
liability is protected by a federal court. The Court's decision protects both
shipowners' right to limitation and claimants' right to pursue claims in state
court, although, given the inherent conflict between the saving to suitors clause
and the Limitation Act, it is hardly likely to settle the conflict entirely.
II. FACTS AND HOLDiNG
Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc. ("Lewis & Clark") operates tugs and fleets on
the Mississippi River in the Saint Louis Harbor? On March 17, 1998, James
Lewis, an employee of Lewis & Clark, was working as a deckhand aboard Lewis
& Clark's ship the M/V Karen Michelle when he allegedly tripped over a wire
and injured his lower back.4
1. 531 U.S. 438 (2001).
2. In re Dammers, 836 F.2d 750, 754 (2d Cir. 1988).
3. Brief for Respondent at 4, Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438
(2001) (No. 99-1331).
4. Lewis, 531 U.S. at 440.
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Anticipating suit by Lewis, one week after the alleged injury Lewis & Clark
filed a complaint for exoneration from, or limitation of, liability in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, pursuant to the
Limitation of Liability Act.5 Filed with the complaint was an affidavit of value
prepared by a marine surveyor attesting that, on the day of Lewis' alleged injury,
the value of the Karen Michelle was $450,000.6 Lewis & Clark filed a surety
bond representing Lewis & Clark's interest in the Karen Michelle for that
amount and motioned the district court to approve the security for value.'
Following the procedure prescribed in Supplemental Admiralty and Maritime
Rule F,8 on May 8, 1998, the district court entered an order approving the surety
bond and ordering any person with a claim arising from the events of March 17,
1998 to file a claim with the court by June 12, 1998.9 The court also enjoined
the prosecution of any other suits against Lewis & Clark related to the events of
March 17, 1998.0
Prior to the district court's order, and allegedly unaware of Lewis & Clark's
pending limitation proceeding, Lewis filed an action in state court." Lewis filed
suit against Lewis & Clark in the Circuit Court of Madison County, Illinois on
April 2, 1998.12 Lewis' claims were based on negligence under the Jones Act, 3
5. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-189 (2000). The general effect of the Act is to limit the
shipowner's liability, in cases where the owner was without privity or knowledge, to the
value of the owner's interest in the vessel and its pending freight. Id. § 183. For a more
in depth discussion of the Act, see infra notes 71-156 and accompanying text.
6. Brief for Respondent at 5, Lewis (No. 99-1331).
7. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Lewis (No. 99-133 1).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. Admiralty Rule F.
9. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Lewis (No. 99-133 1).
10. Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438,441 (2001).
11. Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, Lewis (No. 99-1331).
12. Id.
13. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (2000). The Jones Act, enacted in 1920, gives to a
seaman injured in the course of his employment a cause of action for negligence against
his employer. THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 262 (3d ed.
2001). A Jones Act claim is an in personam action rather than one in rem. Plamals v.
The Pinar Del Rio, 277 U.S. 151, 156 (1928). For the importance of this distinction, see
infra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
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unseawortbiness, 4 and maintenance and cure. 5 Lewis waived his right to ajury
trial of these claims. 6
On June 9, 1998, Lewis answered Lewis & Clark's complaint in federal
district court and filed a claim for damages in excess of the $450,000 limitation
fund represented by Lewis & Clark's surety bond. 7 On the same day, in an
effort to pursue his action in state court, Lewis filed a motion to dissolve the
district court's restraining order that enjoined the prosecution of other suits.'
Lewis' motion claimed that he was entitled to dissolution of the restraining order
because he was the only claimant seeking damages from the incident aboard the
Karen Michelle on March 17, 1998. " Lewis also entered stipulations that (1) he
waived any claim of res judicata concerning the issue of limited liability that
would arise from the state court action and that (2) Lewis & Clark could
relitigate in federal district court any issues relating to limitation of liability.2'
Lewis later entered another stipulation, that his claim was for less than $400,000,
recanting his earlier claim in excess of the value of the limitation fund.2'
In reaching its decision to dissolve the restraining order, the district court
noted the conflict between its exclusive admiralty jurisdiction to determine
Lewis & Clark's right to limited liability and the saving to suitors clause in 28
U.S.C. § 1333(1),' which saves "common law rights and remedies, including
14. An unseaworthiness claim is based on the shipowner's duty to ensure that the
vessel is fit for its intended purpose. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13, at 163. The duty is
absolute and its breach does not depend upon negligence by the shipowner. Mitchell v.
Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 547-48 (1960).
15. Lewis, 531 U.S. at 441. Maintenance and cure is an ancient obligation of the
shipowner to provide food, lodging, and medical services to a seaman who becomes ill
or is injured while in the service of the ship. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
The duty continues for some period beyond the end of the voyage but is not indefinite.
Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 529-30 (1938).
16. Lewis, 531 U.S. at 441.
17. In re Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1166 (E.D. Mo. 1998),
rev'd, 196 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 531 U.S. 438 (2001).
18. Id.
19. Lewis, 531 U.S. at 441.
20. Id. at 441-42.
21. In re Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d at 1166. It seems obvious
that this was done in order to make the claim an amount less than the limitation fund,
and, thus, create an adequate fund case. One might question the propriety of such an
action, as Justice Harlan appeared to do in Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U.S. 147,
152-53 (1957) (J. Harlan, dissenting); see text accompanying note 189.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction,
exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime
jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise
entitled."
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the right to a jury trial, in the forum of the claimant's choice."' So, while the
Limitation of Liability Act gives the shipowner the right to have limitation
considered in federal district court, the district court found that the saving to
suitors clause gives the claimant the right to pursue an action in state court. The
district court noted two exceptions to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts that are used "to reconcile the 'recurring and inherent conflict"' between
the two statutes and that allow a claimant to pursue an action in state court. The
first exception arises when the value of the limitation fund exceeds all claims
against it, and the second exception arises when a single claimant seeks damages
in excess of the limitation fund.24 Finding that the first exception, and probably
the second as well, applied in the case before it, the district court dissolved the
injunction.'
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
decision, holding that the district court had abused its discretion in dissolving the
injunction.26 The Eighth Circuit, while agreeing that there was potential for
conflict between the Limitation of Liability Act and the saving to suitors clause,
concluded that there was no conflict in the instant case.' Explaining that it had
considered whether the shipowner was entitled to remain in federal court and
whether the claimant was pursuing a saved remedy in another forum, the court
concluded that Lewis & Clark was entitled to seek exoneration of liability, not
just limitation, and that Lewis, because he had waived a jury trial, did not have
a saved remedy in state court.2"
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's
decision.' The Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that the
Limitation of Liability Act gave Lewis & Clark the absolute right to seek
exoneration from liability in federal court.3" The Court also disagreed with the
Eighth Circuit's conclusion that Lewis did not have a "saved" remedy because
he was not seeking a jury trial in his state court action.3' The Court held that
"state courts, with all their remedies, may adjudicate claims like [Lewis'] against
vessel owners so long as the vessel owner's right to seek limitation of liability
is protected."32
23. In re Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d at 1167-68.
24. Id. at 1168.
25. Id. at 1169.
26. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc. v. Lewis, 196 F.3d 900,910 (8th Cir. 1999), revd,
531 U.S. 438 (2001).
27. Id.
28. Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 443 (2001).
29. Id. at 440.
30. Id. at 453.
31. Id. at 454.
32. Id. at 455.
[Vol. 67
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HI. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Saving to Suitors Clause
The foundation for the development of all admiralty law in the United
States is Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution, which provides
that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend... to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction."33 This exclusive jurisdiction granted to the federal courts was
formulated in the Judiciary Act of 1789, but the Act saved "to suitors, in all
cases, the right of a common law remedy where the common law is competent
to give it."34 Presently, the jurisdictional grant is in 28 U.S.C. § 1333, which
provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction exclusive of the
courts of the States, of, (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime
jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which
they are otherwise entitled. (2) Any prize brought into the United
States and all proceedings for the condemnation of property taken as
prize.35
The result has been what the Supreme Court has described as a "highly intricate
interplay of the States and the National Government in their regulation of
maritime commerce."36
What was originally intended by the saving to suitors clause is the subject
of some debate." The common law courts had always had jurisdiction to hear
tort and contract actions against shipowners when the actions were brought in
33. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. For a general discussion of admiralty
jurisdiction, see SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13, ch. 1. Admiralty criminal jurisdiction is
provided for in Article I, section 8, conferring power on Congress "[t]o define and Punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
34. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 23, 77 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (2000)).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000) (emphasis added).
36. Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 373 (1959).
37. Compare William R. Casto, The Origins ofFederal Admiralty Jurisdiction in
an Age ofPrivateers, Smugglers, and Pirates, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 117,139-49 (1993)
with Jonathan M. Gutoff, Original Understandings and the Private Law Origins of the
Federal'Admiralty Jurisdiction: A Reply to Professor Casto, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 361,
387-90 (1999).
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personam.35 In New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchant's Bank of
Boston,39 the Court explained:
The [state] courts exercise a concurrent jurisdiction in nearly all the
cases of admiralty cognizance, whether of tort or contract (with the
exception of proceedings in rem) .... The saving clause was inserted,
probably, from abundant caution, lest the exclusive terms in which the
power is conferred on the District Courts might be deemed to have
taken away the concurrent remedy which had before existed. This
leaves the concurrent power where it stood at common law.4o
Thus, state courts remained competent to give common law remedies in civil
actions to enforce a right granted by maritime law.4 1 The saving clause does not
itself affirmatively grant jurisdiction on state courts; rather, it is an exception to
the federal courts' exclusive admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.42 The savings
clause protects the right to proceed in state court concerning maritime torts and
contracts, and, unlike admiralty courts, which are exclusively bench trials, ajury
trial is usually available to claimants in a state court action.43
As already suggested, the most important distinction affecting whether a
claim falls within and is saved by the "saving clause" is whether the suit is in
personam or in rem. Federal admiralty jurisdiction is exclusive in maritime
causes of action carried on as proceedings in rem, but the saving clause protects
the right to bring inpersonam actions in state court." An inpersonam action is
one "against the person," such as against a shipowner as an individual.45 An in
rem action, on the other hand, is a unique American admiralty procedure against
a ship or other maritime property.'  In rem actions are based on the
personification of a vessel.47 Because a vessel is given the legal status of a
38. 1-VIII BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 121 (2001).
39. 47 U.S. 344 (1848).
40. Id. at 390.
41. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13, at 99.
42. 2AM. JUR. 2DAdmiralty § 121 (1964).
43. 1-VII BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 123 (2001).
44. Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 560 (1954).
45. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 795 (7th ed. 1999).
46. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13, at 995.
47. Martin Davies, In Defense of Unpopular Virtues: Personification and
Ratification, 75 TUL. L. REv. 337, 339 (2000). Personification has a long history; it was
applied by the English admiralty courts as early as the 1500s. Id. at 341. The doctrine
considers "a ship as having rights and obligations separate from those of its owner. Id.
at 338. Personification is a legal fiction similar to the treatment of a corporation as a
"person." Although few would seriously question the legal fiction of corporations, the
[Vol. 67
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person, it can be sued, and itself may sue, in its own name." Personification
recognizes the ship as the offending thing rather than its owner, and an in
personam judgment against the owner will not necessarily bar a later action
against the ship in rem. 9 Situations where the ship may be liable in rem while
the owner is not liable in personam include damage from a collision while the
ship was in the hands of a compulsory pilot or where damage is caused by the
master or crew of a ship under bareboat charter." In rem actions also carry vith
them the strong tool of maritime arrest which allows a plaintiff to seek the arrest
of the offending vessel, typically without notice to the shipowner."
An in rem action against a ship is not an action "at common law." 2 Thus,
the Supreme Court determined from an early date that the saving to suitors
clause and its protection of common law remedies does not permit state courts
to entertain in rem proceedings; those are reserved exclusively for the federal
district courts.5 3 Rather, what the saving clause did was grant in personam
jurisdiction to the state courts, concurrent with the federal district courts, in
maritime causes of action.54
The Court has also explained the difference between rights and remedies:55
"A right is a well founded or acknowledged claim; a remedy is the means
employed to enforce a right or redress an injury."5 6 The effect of the saving
clause is to allow a right created by maritime law to be enforced by a common
law remedy.57 Thus, while the remedy is one of common law, the rights of the
parties are still determined by maritime law.58 As an example, a claimant might
personification of vessels has been frequently attacked, and the United States is almost
alone in its continued use of the doctrine. Id. at 339-41. As one author has noted
however, "[i]f anything, the fiction that a corporation somehow has a metaphysical
identity separate from the people who own and work for it is even less grounded in
reality than the fiction that a ship, a tangible object, can have rights and obligations
independent of those of its owners. The question should be not whether the
personification doctrine is a fiction-it plainly is-but whether it is a useful fiction." Id.
at 340.
48. See generally Davies, supra note 47.
49. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13, at 995-96.
50. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13, at 995-96.
51. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13, at 996.
52. The Hine, 71 U.S. 555, 571 (1866).
53. Id. at 571-72.
54. Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 123 (1924).
55. See Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918).
56. Id. at 384.
57. Id.
58. Id. The Supreme Court has made clear that admiralty claims are not federal
question claims. Romero v. Int'l. Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354,371-72 (1959).
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bring an action in state court against a shipowner for unseaworthiness.
Substantive maritime law will govern the rights of the parties, but the remedy
would be a judgment given by the state court, which, unlike an admiralty court,
may sit with a jury.59
In sum, the effect of the saving clause is that it permits an in personam
action to be brought as an ordinary civil action in state court, or, when an
independent basis for federal jurisdiction exists, in federal court not sitting in
admiralty.' On the other hand, an in rem action is only cognizable in federal
district court, by reference to admiralty jurisdiction.61
Prior to the Eighth Circuit's Lewis & Clark2 opinion, one other circuit had
considered whether a non-jury trial of maritime claims in state court was a
"saved" remedy under the saving to suitors clause. Linton v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co.,63 a case from the Fifth Circuit, involved a Louisiana statute
providing that, when an admiralty or general maritime claim under federal law
was brought in Louisiana state court under the saving to suitors clause and the
claim was designated as an admiralty or general maritime claim, ajury trial was
not available.' Linton, the plaintiff, argued that a designation under the statute
was merely procedural, allowing the case to be tried to a judge rather than a
jury.65 Great Lakes, however, argued that such a designation operated the same
way as a Rule 9(h) designation under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, thus,
invoking exclusive federal admiralty jurisdiction and withdrawing Linton's
claims "at law" under the saving to suitors clause.66
The Fifth Circuit disagreed with Great Lakes' argument. The court noted
that the original language of the saving to suitors clause, saving "the right of a
common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it," had been
changed, and the clause now saved "all other remedies to which [suitors] are
otherwise entitled."67 Thus, the court concluded the clause no longer saved only
"common law remedies."68 Quoting from Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co.,69
the court stated:
59. See, e.g., Chelentis, 247 U.S. at 384.
60. GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 37 (2d
ed. 1975).
61. Id. at 38.
62. 196 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 531 U.S. 438 (2001).
63. 964 F.2d 1480 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 975 (1992).
64. Id. at 1482 (citing LA. CODE Civ. PROC. ANN. art. 1732(6) (West 1990)).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1484.
68. Id. at 1486.
69. 264 U.S. 109, 124 (1924).
[Vol. 67
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The "right of a common law remedy," so saved to suitors, does.., not
include attempted changes by the states in the substantive admiralty
law, but it does include all other means other than proceedings in
admiralty which may be employed to enforce the right or redress the
injury involved. It includes remedies in pas, as well as proceedings
in court; judicial remedies conferred by statute, as well as those
enforceable at the common law; remedies in equity, as well as those
enforceable in a court of law.70
Thus, the court concluded that a jury trial is not a required element of a saving
to suitors remedy and a maritime non-jury action was not necessarily outside the
saving to suitors clause.71
B. The Limitation of Shipowners 'Liability Act7"
Limitation of shipowner's liability, a feature of the maritime law of many
nations, has a very long history, the origins of which are not clear.' Oliver
Wendell Holmes traced it to noxae deditio, a Roman legal principle whereby an
owner could discharge liability for damage caused to another by his property by
delivering that property to the injured party.74 Most scholars give little credit to
this theory.75 Instead, most scholars point to examples of a right to limitation
that are found in the Consulato del Mare of Barcelona, an early code that had a
persuasive effect on the law of other European nations.76 The risks of transport
on the seas, still risky today and especially hazardous in the days of wooden
sailing ships, made a shipowner subject to the possibility of great liability.
Limitation was a way to encourage investment in maritime ventures by limiting
70. Linton, 946 F.2d at 1486 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 1491. In its Lewis & Clark decision, the Eighth Circuit distinguished
Linton on the grounds that Linton was not a case involving the Limitation of Liability
Act. See Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc. v. Lewis, 196 F.3d 900, 910 (1999), rev'd, 531
U.S. 438(2001). To the extent that Linton stands for the proposition that a non-jury trial
is a remedy saved by the saving to suitors clause, it is not apparent how the Linton
holding is distinguishable from the issue before the Eighth Circuit.
72. Limitation of shipowner's liability is a fundamental and complex area of
admiralty law. This Note can do no more than provide a very broad overview.
73. The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 126 (1894).
74. James J. Donovan, The Origins andDevelopment ofLimitation ofShipowners'
Liability, 53 TuL. L. REV. 999, 1000 (1979).
75. Id.
76. Dennis J. Stone, The Limitation ofLiability Act: Time to Abandon Ship?, 32
J. MAR. L. & COM. 317,318-19 (2001).
9
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investors' personal liability." As increased commerce made its way throughout
Europe, so did the concept of limited liability.7" Provisions for limitation are
found in the Hanseatic ordinances, the Maritime Codes of Charles II of Sweden,
and a Rotterdam ordinance.79 All of these provided that the shipowner would not
be subject to liability greater than the value of his ship. The French Ordinance
of 1681, upon which many maritime codes were founded, also provided for
limitation of shipowners' liability. 0
At the same time, however, England was still without a limitation law."'
English shipowners called on Parliament to give them some sort of protection
after a 1734 case in which shipowners were found liable for an entire cargo of
bullion, loaded in Portugal, that was stolen by the ship's master.12 The English
limitation act, 3 passed in 1734, provided that shipowners were not liable, in
excess of the value of the ship and its freight due or coming due for the voyage,
for losses occasioned by embezzlement by the ship's master or mariners, or for
any damage they caused, without the privity or knowledge of the shipowner.
The scope of the English statute's protection was expanded in 1786 and again
in 1814.85
The first limitation statutes passed in the United States were in
Massachusetts (1818) and Maine (183 1).86 Both statutes, like the English statute,
valued the ship at the beginning of the voyage rather than after the occurrence
of the loss in question.87 Both statutes were later amended, however, to follow
the continental limitation laws which valued the ship "post-casualty." 8 A call
for a national limitation law in the United States followed in the wake of New
Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank of Boston,89 in which the
77. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13, at 808.
78. Stone, supra note 76, at 318.
79. Donovan, supra note 74, at 1003-04.
80. The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 126 (1894).
81. Id. at 127.
82. Stone, supra note 76, at 321.
83. 7 Geo. 2, ch. 13 (1734).
84. The Main, 152 U.S. at 127.
85. 3-I BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 4 (2001).
86. The Main, 152 U.S. at 128.
87. Carter T. Gunn, Limitation of Liability: United States and Convention
Jurisdictions, 8 MAR. LAw. 29, 30-31 (1983).
88. Id. at 31. In effect, this allows the shipowner to be free of further obligation
by surrendering the ship, be it damaged beyond repair or even sunk, after the casualty in
question. The implications of this are evident in In re Barracuda Tanker Corp. (The
Torrey Canyon), 281 F. Supp. 228 (1968), discussed infra notes 117-24 and
accompanying text.
89. 47 U.S. 344 (1848).
[Vol. 67
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defendant-shipowner was held liable for $18,000 in specie which, after the
disastrous conclusion of the voyage, lay at the bottom of Long Island Sound."
The specie was loaded onto the steamboat Lexington in a wooden crate by
William F. Hamden, who had collected the money in New York for Merchants'
Bank and was sending it to Boston.9 Shortly after the Lexington sailed from
New York, a fire broke out on board the ship and eventually consumed it. The
cause of the fire was apparently a number of bales of cotton stowed next to the
ship's steam-chimney.' Finding gross negligence, the shipowner was held liable
for the specie despite a contractual agreement between Hamden and New Jersey
Steam that New Jersey Steam would not be liable for any loss of the contents of
Hamden's crate.93
The outcry following New Jersey Navigation led to the passage of the
Limitation of Liability Act9 4 in 1851.15 The Act passed without debate in the
House of Representatives and less than a full day's debate in the Senate.96 The
key provision of the Act is found in Section 183(a). This section limits a vessel
owner's liability for any losses that occur without the owner's privity or
knowledge to the value of the owner's interest in the vessel and the freight then
pending.97
90. Id. at 378-79. In addition to the loss of property, there was a considerable loss
of life, a disturbing example of which was included in a narrative, made part of the
Court's opinion, by one of the survivors. Stephen Manchester, the pilot of the boat,
managed to climb aboard a floating bale of cotton, on which a man named McKinney
was already aboard. Id. at 349. Manchester had to pull McKinney out of the water after
another survivor tried unsuccessfully to jump onto the bale. Id. According to
Manchester, "McKinney froze to death about daylight the next morning, and fell off the
bale." Id.
91. Id. at 379.
92. Id. at 384.
93. Id. at 344-45.
94. 9 Stat. 635 (1851) (codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-89 (2000)).
95. Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1871). The Norwich opinion
refers primarily to the loss of another ship, the Henry Clay, as the impetus for the
Limitation Act. The literature generally does not reflect this.
96. GiLMORE & BLACK, supra note 60, at 819.
97. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183(a) (2000). Section 183(a) provides:
The liability of the owner of any vessel, whether American or foreign, for any
embezzlement, loss, or destruction by any person of any property, goods, or
merchandise shipped or put on board of such vessel, or for any loss, damage,
or injury by collision, or for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or
forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowledge of
such owner or owners, shall not, except in the cases provided for in
subsection (b) of this section, exceed the amount or value of the interest of
such owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending.
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Who qualifies as an "owner" under the Act was considered in Flink v.
Paladini (The Henrietta)."8 In Flink, the Court concluded that the term should be
construed liberally in a "broad and popular sense" in order to give effect to the
Act's intent.99 While the "owner" will typically be the person or other entity1°
holding title to the vessel, title is not always dispositive.'0' A life tenant and
trustee holding the remainder in a vessel have been found to be "owners" within
the Act. 2 The United States government can also limit its liability under the
Act' 3 as can a foreign shipowner sued in the United States. 4 On the other
hand, abailee is not entitled to limitation,' 5 nor is someone who holds title to the
ship simply as security.'0 Insurers of a ship are also not its "owners," but
insurers will be considered owners if the ship is abandoned to the insurance
underwriters as a total loss.'07 Finally, a separate provision of the Act provides
that a charterer who "man[s], victual[s], and navigate[s]" a vessel is an owner
under the Act.00
The Act also defines "vessel" broadly, extending the right to limitation to
any "seagoing vessels, and.., all vessels used on lakes or rivers or in inland
navigation, including canal boats, barges, and lighters."'0 9 To fall within the Act,
a vessel must be a structure capable of being a means of transportation." 0
Although controversial, the law is well settled that pleasure craft (private, non-
Id.
98. 279 U.S. 59 (1929).
99. Id. at 63.
100. Such entities would include a corporation or partnership.
101. In re Nobles, 842 F. Supp. 1430, 1437 (N.D. Fla. 1993).
102. In re Colonial Trust Co., 124 F. Supp. 73, 76 (D. Conn. 1954).
103. See Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas S.A. v. United States, 730 F.2d
153, 155 (4th Cir. 1984).
104. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Mellor, 233 U.S. 718, 732-33 (1914). This
case involved the tragic sinking ofthe Titanic, the subject ofnumerous books and several
movies. Despite the fact that the Titanic had not sailed from the United States and never
reached the United States, the Court determined that, when a claimant sued in a United
States court, the shipowner could claim the benefit of limited liability there. Id.
105. The Severance, 152 F.2d 916,921 (4th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 853
(1946).
106. Am. Car & Foundry Co. v. Brassert, 289 U.S. 261, 264-66 (1933).
107. Gunn, supra note 87, at 34-35.
108. 46 U.S.C. app. § 186 (2000). This has been interpreted to qualify demise and
bareboat charterers, but not voyage or time charterers, as "owners" under the Act.
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13, at 810-11. For an explanation of the various forms of
charter, see SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13, ch. 9.
109. 46 U.S.C. app. § 188 (2000).
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commercial boats) qualify as "vessels" eligible for limitation."' Thus, owners
of yachts, motorboats, and personal watercraft have all been afforded the
protections of the Act."'
Limitation under the Act is conditioned on the owner's lack of "privity or
knowledge" of the acts of negligence or unseaworthiness that caused the injury
in question." 3  The "privity or knowledge" condition has been frequently
described, quoting language from Lord v. Goodall, Etc., Steamship Co., 4 as
requiring "some personal concurrence, or some fault or negligence on the part
of the owner himself, or in which he personally participates.""' The vessel
owner has the burden of affirmatively proving lack of privity or knowledge.'
6
The value of the vessel, which, along with the pending freight, establishes
the value of the limitation fund, is determined at the end of the voyage during
which the loss or collision occurred. 7 The Supreme Court, considering the
Limitation Act for the first time in Norwich Co. v. Wright, chose this approach,
111. See, e.g., Keys Jet Ski, Inc. v. Kays, 893 F.2d 1225, 1229 (1lth Cir. 1990);
In re Young, 872 F.2d 176, 177 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990);
Hechinger v. Caskie, 890 F.2d 202, 206 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 848
(1990). While the courts of appeals considering the issue are unanimous, several district
courts have held that pleasure boat owners cannot limit. See, e.g., Estate of Lewis, 683
F. Supp. 217, 220 (N.D. Cal. 1987); In re Sisson, 668 F. Supp. 1196, 1198 (N.D. Ill.
1987). Courts holding that pleasure boats are not covered by the Act generally justify
their decision on the ground that the purpose of the Limitation Act was to encourage
commercial activity and does not extend to recreational boating. See, e.g., Estate of
Lewis, 683 F Supp. at 220 (using particularly strong langauge, saying that "we can
perceive no reason to extend that protection to the relatively affluent owners of pleasure
boats and their insurers at the expense of those injured or killed and their families").
While one can very well question granting the right to limit to pleasure boat owners,
limitation of liability is of ancient vintage and continues to be an important aspect of
maritime commerce. The United States is not alone in maintaining some form of
limitation of liability. Many European nations still allow for the limitation of liability,
although not to the extent of the United States' limitation act. In those nations adhering
to the 1957 or 1976 Limitation Conventions, the value of the limitation fund is based on
the vessel's tonnage, not on the value of the vessel after the incident in question.
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13, at 809 n.7. This results in a substantially larger limitation
fund than that which may occur under the U.S. limitation act. Id. On the other hand,
those conventions allow limitation to a larger class of parties and the standard for
defeating limitation is higher than in the U.S. Id. See also Carter T. Gunn, Limitation
ofLiability: United States and Convention Jurisdictions, 8 MAR. LAW. 29,53 (1983).
112. Stone, supra note 76, at 332.
113. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13, at 823.
114. 15 F. Cas. 884 (C.C.D. Cal. 1887) (No. 8,506).
115. Id. at 887.
116. 3-V BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 41 (2001).
117. Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. 104, 126 (1871).
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followed by continental Europe, rather than the English approach, which valued
the ship prior to the collision or loss."8 Thus, a shipowner is relieved of any
liability by surrendering the ship, whatever its value. As the Court recognized
in Norwich, that value will be nothing if the ship is a total loss." 9 Perhaps the
most notorious example of the possible implication of this approach to valuing
the owner's interest in the ship arose in Barracuda Tanker Corp.2 ' The Torrey
Canyon, a tanker carrying 119,328 tons of crude oil, was stranded off the
southwest coast of England.' Oil from the ship heavily polluted both sides of
the English Channel, and the ship was eventually bombed and sunk by the Royal
Air Force." Barracuda Tanker, the owner of the Torrey Canyon, filed a
complaint for limitation of liability in federal district court."u The ship itself a
total loss, the district court approved a stipulated value of Barracuda's interest
in the ship of fifty dollars, the value of a single lifeboat salvaged from the
wreck.'24
Unique valuation issues arise where one vessel is tugging or towing other
vessels, a familiar situation on inland waterways where tugs and barges are
present. The issue is, which vessel determines the limitation fund?
As a general rule, where one vessel is the active instrumentality and
the other vessels are only passive instruments of navigation, the only
vessel included in the limitation fund will be the vessel actively
involved in the harm. The tows or other passive vessels are not
included because they are helpless and under the control of the
actively responsible vessel. If, in contrast, the vessels are subject to
common ownership, engaged in a single enterprise, and under
common control at the time of the casualty, they are considered to be
a flotilla, and all must be surrendered in limitation."z
Along with the vessel or its value, the shipowner must surrender the
vessel's "freight then pending."'26 In maritime law, "freight" refers not to the
118. Id. at 126-27.
119. Id. at 127.
120. Barracuda Tanker Corp. (The Torrey Canyon), 281 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
121. Id. at 229.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 229-30.
124. Id. at 230. The case was eventually settled for £3,000,000, divided equally
between France and the United Kingdom. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 60, at 824
n.131.
125. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13, at 827.
126. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183(a) (2000).
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thing carried but the compensation due for carrying it. 27 Freight includes money
for transporting passengers, unless the passenger's ticket provides that its cost
will be refunded if the transportation is not carried through.'28 A shipowner
claiming the protection of the Limitation Act can enter a stipulation as to the
value of the freight, pay that amount to the court, or transfer the shipowner's
interest in the freight to a trustee. 129 The shipowner must attempt to collect the
freight, but she is only required to collect that which can be collected "with
proper effort," and may assign the rest.1 31
Two further provisions of the Act pertain to particular situations. Section
181 fully exonerates a shipowner for the value of certain enumerated articles, for
the most part characterized by their high value, when the party shipping them
does not advise the shipowner in writing "of the true character and value
thereof' and enter that information on the bill of lading.' The items
enumerated include, among other things, gold or silver, diamonds or other
precious stones, glass, china and silks.13 1 Section 183(b), originally added to the
Act in 1935, requires that, in cases of death or bodily injury, when the claims for
such injuries cannot be satisfied in full, the portion of the fund available for those
claims must be increased to an amount of $60 per ton of the vessel's tonnage.3
The amount was increased to $420 per ton in 1984."M
Although the Limitation of Liability Act was passed in 1851, it did not
come before the Supreme Court until 1871, when the Court decidedNorwich Co.
v. Wright.'35 As the Court's opinion in this case makes clear, the Court found
itself faced with a statute creating a right but that was completely inadequate in
explaining the proceedings by which that right was to be enforced. 36 For
127. The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 129 (1894).
128. 3-VII BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 65 (2001).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 46 U.S.C. app. § 181 (2000). Presumably, had the Limitation Act existed at
the time of the disaster in New Jersey Navigation Co., the owner would have been
exonerated of liability for the contents of Hamden's crate, given that the contents were
kept secret and not listed on the bill of lading. See N.J. Steam Navigation Co. v.
Merchant's Bank of Boston, 47 U.S. 344, 364 (1848).
132. 46 U.S.C. app. § 181 (2000).
133. Id. § 183(b). The impetus for this amendment was the terrible disaster aboard
the passenger ship Morrow Castle which burned, killing 135 people. Gunn, supra note
87, at 32-33.
134. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183(b) (2000).
135. 80 U.S. 104 (1871).
136. See id. at 122-28. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, an important scholar and author
in the area of admiralty law, has written that "[the] 1851 Act, badly drafted even by the
standards of the time, continues in effect today." SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13, at 809.
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instance, the Court noted that "[t]he act does not state what court shall be
resorted to, nor what proceedings shall be taken."'37 Faced with a difficult
situation, the Court stated that "[t]he proper course of proceeding for obtaining
the benefit of the act would seem to be this.. ." and, sua sponte, set about
creating its own rules of procedure to implement Congress' act. 38 The Court
formally issued its rules a year later, revising them periodically in the years that
followed. 39 The first guidance from Congress as to the procedure to be followed
came in its 1936 amendments to the Act.'" Following the merger of the federal
civil and admiralty procedural rules in 1966,' 4 the procedure is now provided
for in the Act itself (via the 1936 amendments) and in Supplemental Admiralty
Rule F of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'42
The basic procedure is as follows: When a shipowner is faced with a claim
or expects to be faced with a claim, the owner files a complaint (also referred to
as a petition) for exoneration from or limitation of liability in federal district
court sitting in admiraltyjurisdiction.'43 The owner has six months from the time
the owner receives written notice of a claim to file this complaint,'" or, in the
alternative, an owner may plead limitation as a defense without regard to the six-
month time limit.45 Venue is proper in any district in which the vessel has been
attached or arrested, or, if it has not been attached or arrested, in any district in
which the owner has been sued regarding the claim.'" If the vessel has not been
attached or arrested, and suit has not been initiated, venue is proper in the district
The Supreme Court quoted this language in its Lewis opinion. Lewis v. Lewis & Clark
Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438,447 (2001)
137. Norwich Co., 80 U.S. at 123.
138. Id. at 125.
139. 80 U.S. xii-xiv (1872).
140. Amendments to the Limitation of Liability Act, ch. 531, § 1, 49 Stat. 1479
(1936) (codified as amended at46 U.S.C. app. § 183 (2000)), GILMORE &BLACK, supra
note 60, at 839.
141. Prior to 1966, federal courts used one set of rules when sitting in admiraltyjurisdiction, and another when sitting as courts of law and equity. GILMORE & BLACK,
supra note 60, ch. 1, § 1-1. The older cases reflect the terms used under the admiralty
rules: plaintiffs were "libellants," defendants "respondents," a complaint was a "libel,"
and the lawyers "proctors in admiralty" or "proctors." See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13,
at9.
142. See FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. Adm. Rule F.
143. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. Adm. Rule F(l). In contrast to the original English
limitation act, the shipowner has never been required to admit liability to gain the benefit
of limited liability.
144. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. Adm. Rule F(l). As noted, if the owner anticipates a
claim, the owner may file a complaint before actually receiving notice of any claim.
145. Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 543 (1931).
146. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. Adm. Rule F(9).
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in which the vessel is located, or, if the vessel is not located in any district (the
vessel is out of the country for instance) then venue is proper in any district.47
In addition to the complaint, the shipowner must deposit with the court an
amount equal to the owner's interest in the vessel and pending freight, or
security for that amount, along with "such sums... as the court may from time
to time fix as necessary."'48 In the alternative, the owner may transfer his
interest in the vessel to a trustee appointed by the court. 4 9
If the preceding requirements are met, a district court will issue an
injunction staying all other proceedings against the shipowner or the owner's
property.' 0 The court will also issue a "monition" to all other claimants that
requires them to file their claims with the court clerk within a certain period, not
less than thirty days from the date of issuance.'' The purpose of this procedure
is to create a "concursus"of claims so that all claims arising from the casualty in
question are considered in a single proceeding in the district court. This is
necessary because, where the limitation fund is not adequate to satisfy all claims
against the shipowner, the court must divide the fund amongst the claimants pro
rata."52 This allows the court to accomplish the primary purpose of the Act,
which is "to provide a marshaling of assets [and] the distribution pro rata of an
inadequate fund among claimants, none of whom can be paid in full."'
5 3
A limitation proceeding in a district court involves several steps. Sitting in
admiralty without a jury, the court first determines whether the injury
147. FED. R. CIV. P. Supp. Adm. Rule F(9).
148. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. Adm. Rule F(l). While the Act, as originally drafted,
provided only for transferring the ship to a trustee, posting security for the ship rather
than transferring it has been allowed since the Supreme Court first considered the Act in
Norwich. GILMoRE & BLACK, supra note 60, at 838; see also Norwich Co. v. Wright,
80 U.S 104, 125 (1871). This alternative was never questioned, and was eventually
written into the Act itself. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 185 (2000). If a claimant believes that
the funds deposited with the court are less than the owner's interest in the vessel and
pending freight, the claimant may motion the court and the court will order an appraisal,
ordering an increase in the funds if necessary. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. Adm. Rule F(7).
149. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. Adm. Rule F(l).
150. FED. R. CIV. P. Supp. Adm. Rule F(3). In certain situations, however, a
claimant will be allowed to pursue an action in state court. See infra notes 159-243 and
accompanying text.
151. FED. R. CIV. P. Supp. Adm. Rule F(4).
152. 46 U.S.C. app. § 184 (2000). Because the limitation proceeding is by its
nature equitable, the court may modify the pro rata distribution. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co. v. S. Pac. Co., 273 U.S. 207,219 (1927).
153. In re Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1167 (E.D. Mo. 1998)
(quoting In re Moran Transp. Corp., 185 F.2d 386, 389 (2d Cir. 1950)), rev'd, 196 F.3d
900 (8th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 531 U.S. 438 (2001)) (internal quotations marks omitted).
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complained of was the result of negligence or unseaworthiness.'54 The burden
of proof to show negligence or unseaworthiness is on the claimant."ss The
burden is then on the shipowner to prove the lack of privity or knowledge that
would entitle the owner to limitation under the statute.'56 If limitation is denied,
the court may go on to decide the case on the merits."s7 Thus, there are three
possible outcomes of the limitation proceeding.' First, the shipowner may be
exonerated from all liability, in which case the payment, security, or ship is
returned to the owner. Second, the owner could be found liable, but because he
lacked privity or knowledge, the owner is entitled to limitation. In such a case,
the claimants are paid from the limitation fund and the shipowner is granted a
permanent injunction against further claims or suits. The third possibility is that
the shipowner is found to be liable and not entitled to limitation because of the
owner's privity or knowledge.
C. Conflict Between Saving to Suitors and Limitation of Liability
The procedure outlined above takes place exclusively in federal court,
sitting in admiralty, without a jury. Normally, in these cases the court will
decide both the owner's right to limitation of liability as well as the merits of the
plaintiffs claims. There are situations, however, where the courts have
determined that, in light of the rights created by the saving to suitors clause, a
claimant must be permitted to pursue claims in state court, while the limitation
issues are still decided in federal court. Those exceptions are where there is only
a single claimant against the fund" 9 and where the claims of multiple claimants
do not exceed the value of the limitation fund. 16 °
1. The Single Claimant Exception
The single claimant exception was approved by the Supreme Court in
Langnes v. Green,'6' a case involving a fisherman's loss of an eye from a fish
hook while working aboard the defendant's fishing vessel. 62 The fisherman
154. Farrell Lines Inc. v. Jones, 530 F.2d 7, 10 (5th Cir. 1976).
155. Coleman v. Jahncke Serv., Inc., 341 F.2d 956, 958 (5th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 974 (1996).
156. Id.
157. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 60, at 863.
158. 3-I BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 12 (2001).
159. See Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931).
160. See Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U.S. 147 (1957).
161. 282 U.S. 531 (1931).
162. The Aloha, 35 F.2d 447, 448 (9th Cir. 1929), rev'd sub nom. Langnes v.
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filed an action in state court, and, two days before the trial date, the shipowner
filed for limitation in federal district court, after which the district court enjoined
the state court action. 63 On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that because he was the
sole claimant and there was only one shipowner, the shipowner should have
plead limitation in state court."' The Ninth Circuit disagreed but was reversed
by the Supreme Court. 6 The Supreme Court noted that the saving to suitors
clause made the state court a legitimate forum for the plaintiff's claim, while the
Limitation of Liability Act made the federal district court the legitimate forum
for the shipowner's right to limit liability.' The Court noted that the district
court was presented with two choices: maintaining the action, which would
preserve the right of the shipowner but destroy the right of the claimant to a
common law remedy in state court; or allowing the state court action to go
forward while retaining the limitation petition in the event that the state court
action threatened the shipowner's right to limitation, which would preserve the
rights of both parties. 6 The Supreme Court found that the district court had
improperly chosen the former.'68 The Supreme Court, however, noted that
whether to dissolve an injunction against proceedings in other courts in each
individual case was a matter reserved to the district courts' discretion, which in
this case the Court found to have been abused.' 69
Subsequent cases have explained the four conditions to which a single
claimant must agree in order to pursue an action in state court. These
conditions require a claimant to:
a) file his claim in the limitation proceeding;
b) where a stipulation for value has been filed in lieu of the transfer of
the ship to a trustee, concede the sufficiency in amount of the
stipulation;
c) consent to waive any claim of resjudicata relevant to the issue of
limited liability based on any judgment obtained in the state court;
[and]
Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931).
163. Langnes, 282 U.S. at 532-33.
164. Id. at 534.
165. Id. at 544.
166. Id. at 539.
167. Id. at 541.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 544.
170. These cases reference GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 60, at 871.
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d) concede [the] petitioner shipowner's right to litigate all issues
relating to limitation in the limitation proceeding.17'
Because a major purpose of the concursus of claims in federal court-to
distribute an inadequate limitation fund amongst the claimants-is not
implicated where there is only a single claimant, the single claimant should be
allowed to litigate liability and damage issues in state court, if she complies with
the necessary stipulations.' If the state court (or a federal court sitting in law
rather than admiralty) finds a shipowner liable for damages in excess of the
limitation fund, however, the claimant and shipowner must return to the
admiralty court for a determination of the shipowner's privity or knowledge. 173
Courts have even extended the "single claimant" exception to "multiple
claimant-inadequate fund" cases, as long as the stipulations necessary to protect
the shipowner's right to limitation are present. Beiswenger Enterprises Corp.
v. Carletta" is an example. This case arose from an accident that occurred
while George Myers and his fiancee Kathleen Carletta were parasailing from the
defendant's boat.171 Myers was killed in a bizarre accident. 76 Carletta, Myers'
estate, and Myers' children eventually filed claims in the limitation proceeding
initiated by Beiswenger Enterprises ("BEC").177 The Eleventh Circuit decided
that Carletta and Myers' estate would be allowed to pursue their later-filed action
in Florida state court if they entered the necessary stipulations to protect BEC's
right to limitation.'78 According to the court, the stipulations would have to:
protect the shipowner's right to litigate the issue of limited liability exclusively
in admiralty court, protect the shipowner from being required to pay damages in
excess of the limitation fund ("unless and until the admiralty court denie[d]
limited liability"), and protect the vessel owner from litigation by the claimants
"in any forum outside the limitation proceeding." 79
171. Jefferson Barracks Marine Serv., Inc. v. Casey, 763 F.2d 1007, 1010 (8th Cir.
1985).
172. Beiswenger Enter. Corp. v. Carletta, 86 F.3d 1032, 1037 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
173. Id. at 1038.
174. 86 F.3d 1032 (1 Ith Cir. 1996).
175. Id. at 1034.
176. Id. A parasailor is pulled by a boat, suspended from an airborne parachute.
In an attempt to retrieve Myers and Carletta, the boat operator cut the line to the
parachute, causing Myers and Carletta to descend to the water. Id. The parachute was
blown back into the air, however, pulling Myers, whose ankle had become entangled in
the line, along with it. Id. The parachute blew toward land and Myers, hanging upside
down from it, "slammed into several shoreside objects," sustaining terminal injuries. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1039.
179. Id. at 1044.
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2. The Adequate Fund Exception
The second circumstance in which the courts have determined that a state
court action should be permitted despite a shipowner's right to limit in federal
court is where the total of all claims against the shipowner does not exceed the
value of the limitation fund. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Lake
Tankers Corp. v. Henn.80 Lake Tankers arose from a collision between a tug
pushing a barge and the Blackstone, a yacht, which sank, killing plaintiffHenn's
husband.'8' Henn and others filed claims in New York state court, after which
Lake Tankers filed a petition for limitation in federal district court."z Answering
the limitation petition, the claimants relinquished a right to damages in excess
of the limitation fund.8 3 Henn filed stipulations agreeing not to increase her
claims and waiving any right to res judicata arising from the state action as to
Lake Tankers' rightto limit liability.'" The district court dissolved its injunction
against the state court proceedings, and the Second Circuit affirmed. 8 ' After
reviewing the Limitation Act's history and purpose, the Supreme Court stated
that it was "crystal clear that the operation of the Act is directed at misfortunes
at sea where the losses incurred exceed the value of the vessel and the pending
freight."' 86 The Court noted that bringing all claims together in a limitation
proceeding (creating a concursus) allowed a court to distribute a fund that was
inadequate to fully meet all the claims against it, but "where the value of the
vessel and the pending freight... exceeds the claims made against it, there is no
necessity for the maintenance of the concourse."'87 The Court then stated:
For [the Court] to expand the jurisdictional provisions of the Act to
prevent respondent from now proceeding in her state case would
transform the Act from a protective instrument to an offensive weapon
by which the shipowner could deprive suitors of their common-law
rights, even where the limitation fund is known to be more than
adequate to satisfy all demands upon it. The shipowner's right to limit
liability is not so boundless. The Act is not one of immunity from
liability but of limitation of it and we read no other privilege for the
180. 354 U.S. 147 (1957).
181. Id. at 148.
182. Id. at 148-49.
183. Id. at 149.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 149-50.
186. Id. at 151.
187. Id. at 152.
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shipowner into its language over and above that granting him limited
liability.'88
In a dissenting opinion, however, Justice Harlan argued that allowing claimants
to limit their recovery "should no more be allowed to defeat or impair the full
effectiveness of the limitation proceeding than would a subsequent reduction in
the amount involved be permitted to defeat a diversity jurisdiction which had
initially been properly invoked."'89
Kreta Shipping S.A. v. Preussag International Steel Corp.9 ° involved an
adequate fund case. Kreta's ship, the Amphion, was carrying a cargo of steel
coils and steel plates when it was caught in a violent winter storm.'9 ' Several
parties sued in United States district court for the resulting damage to the steel,
and Kreta responded by filing a limitation action.' Nordstern, one of the
claimants, filed actions against Kreta in Sweden and later in Belgium. 93 Then,
Nordstem and the other claimants moved the district court to lift its injunction
against other actions, filing a stipulation that the aggregate of the claims against
Kreta did not exceed the limitation fund.'94
In determining that the district court did not err when it lifted the injunction,
the Second Circuit noted that it would not decide whether the saving to suitors
clause protected only common law actions. Rather, the court suggested that
"other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled" in 28 U.S.C. § 1333 might
also protect a "non-common-law" action in a foreign country.19 In any case, the
court stated that it read Lake Tankers to hold that when the limitation fund is
adequate to satisfy all claims against it, the injunction against other actions
should be lifted regardless of whether the claimants are pursuing remedies saved
by the saving to suitors clause or otherwise. 196 The court stated:
188. Id. at 152-53.
189. Id. at 155 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing St. Paul Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co.,
303 U.S. 283 (1938)).
190. 192 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1999).
191. Id. at 43. The court noted that "[n]ineteen ninety-six was not a good year for
the MV AMPHION." On its way from Europe to the United States, the ship
encountered a winter storm so severe that her crew abandoned her, and she had to be
recovered by salvors. Id. Less than four months later, the ship ran aground in India and
was declared a total loss. Id. at 44.
192. Id. at 44.
193. Id. at 45-46.
194. Id. at 46.
195. Id. at49.
196. Id. at 48.
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When the Supreme Court opined that "where the value of the vessel
and the pending freight... exceeds the claims made against it, there
is no necessity for the maintenance of the concourse"... it reached
that conclusion without reference to where or how the claimants
sought to pursue their claims outside the limitation proceeding.... It
did not suggest that the shipowner is nonetheless privileged to insist
on being sued only in courts in the United States. 97
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc.,' 8 Justice O'Connor delivered the
opinion of a unanimous Supreme Court.'99 The Court began by stating that the
case "concern[ed] a seaman's ability to sue a vessel owner in state court for
personal injuries sustained aboard a vessel."2 ' After reviewing the procedural
history of the case, the Court stated that it granted certiorari to settle a conflict
between the Eighth Circuit's decision and the decisions of the other courts of
appeals.20 '
The Court first discussed the saving to suitors clause. The Court noted the
constitutional grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the federal courts
and discussed the Judiciary Act of 1789 which codified that grant but "sav[ed]
to suitors in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law
is competent to give it.""2 2 The Court then noted the uncertainty and ongoing
debate as to what was originally intended by the saving clause, and quoted its
opinion in New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants 'Bank ofBoston,0 3
in which the Court had conjectured that the drafters added the saving to suitors
clause out of concern that the exclusive terms of the jurisdictional grant to the
federal district courts might be misconstrued to mean that state courts no longer
had concurrent powers.2' The Court next briefly reviewed its prior decisions
197. Id. at 48-49 (quoting Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U.S. 147, 152 (1957))
(citations omitted).
198. 531 U.S. 438 (2001).
199. Id. at 440.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 443 (citing Kreta Shipping, 192 F.3d 41; Beiswenger Enter. Corp. v.
Carletta, 86 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir. 1996); Linton v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 964
F.2d 1480 (5th Cir. 1992)).
202. Id. at 443 (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 77 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in
original).
203. 47 U.S. 344 (1848).
204. Lewis, 531 U.S. at 444 (referencing New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v.
Merchants'Bank of Boston, 47 U.S. 344, 390 (1848)).
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considering the saving clause, noting that only proceedings in personam were
saved by the clause and that in rem proceedings were not cognizable in state
courts because in rem actions were not a remedy at common law.2"5 The Court
further noted the distinction drawn between rights and remedies, explaining that
"the saving to suitors clause preserves remedies and the concurrent jurisdiction
of state courts over some admiralty and maritime claims."2"
The Court then turned to the Limitation of Liability Act, stating that it is
one of the "host of special rights, duties, rules, and procedures" included in
admiralty and maritime law, and was intended to put American shipping on an
equal footing with shipping of other nations that had limitation acts.2"7 The
purpose of the Act, the Court noted, was to encourage investment in American
shipping and to put American shipping on the same footing as other maritime
nations that had their own acts limiting shipowners' liability.2"' The Court also
remarked on the poor drafting of the Act, which required the courts to sua sponte
create their own procedures to give the Act effect.2
The Court noted the potential conflict between the saving clause and the
Limitation of Liability Act, explaining that "[o]ne statute gives suitors the right
to a choice of remedies, and the other statute gives vessel owners the right to
seek limitation of liability in federal court.2 10 The Court discussed two earlier
cases where it had need to reconcile that conflict:2 '' Langnes v. Green,212 which
involved a single claimant, and Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn,"3 a case involving
multiple claimants against an adequate fund. Looking at these cases, the Court
said it found the "crystal clear" purpose of the Act to be directed at instances
where the value of the vessel and its freight were less than the value of the
claims against its owner.214 When the value of the vessel and freight exceeded
the claims, however, the federal court action was not necessary, assuming the
proper stipulations were entered by the claimants, to preserve the vessel owner's
right to limited liability.215 The Court quoted a portion of its Lake Tankers
decision, stating that expanding the scope of exclusive federal jurisdiction
"would transform the Act from a protective instrument to an offensive weapon
205. Id.
206. Id. at 445.
207. Id. at 446 (quoting The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 128 (1894)).
208. Id. at 446-47.
209. Id. at 447.
210. Id. at 448.
211. Id. at 448-51.
212. 282 U.S. 531 (1931).
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by which the shipowner could deprive suitors of their common law rights. '2 16
The Act limits liability, rather than immunizing against it, and the Court found
"no other privilege for the shipowner... over and above that granting him
limited liability."21 The Court stated that since Langnes and Lake Tankers, the
courts of appeals had generally allowed state court actions where there was
either only a single claimant or where the limitation fund exceeded the value of
all claims against it.
218
Turning to the case at hand, the Court concluded that the district court
correctly dissolved the injunction against Lewis' state court action in an attempt
to reconcile Lewis' right to his remedy as granted by the saving to suitors clause
and Lewis & Clark's right to limited liability under the Act.21 9 The Court
determined that Lewis & Clark's right to limited liability was sufficiently
protected by Lewis' stipulation regarding the value of his claim, his waiver of
resjudicata regarding limitation of liability, and the district court's maintenance
of the Limitation Act action pending the outcome of the state court action."
The Court went on to explain that the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that the
district court erred in dissolving the injunction was premised on the erroneous
conclusion that Lewis & Clark was entitled to seek exoneration from liability in
federal court and Lewis had no saved remedy under the saving to suitors clause,
and, therefore, there was no conflict between the saving clause and the
Limitation of Liability Act." The Supreme Court, however, concluded that
there was a conflict.' The Court pointed out that Lewis sued in state court
which, under the savings clause, had jurisdiction to consider Lewis' claims,
while Lewis & Clark filed a petition for limitation of liability in federal court,
which had jurisdiction to hear that matter.? Thus, "[b]oth parties selected
legitimate forums for their claims, and therein lies the conflict."2 4 By way of
example, the Court noted that had Lewis tried to initiate an in rem action in state
court, the state court would have been without jurisdiction because the saving to
suitors clause does not save an action in rem.' Likewise, had Lewis & Clark
tried to limit liability for payment of wages in federal court, the federal court





220. Id. at 451-52.
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claims for wages.36 In the present case, though, both parties were pursuing their
actions in a legitimate forum, and the only complication was the other party's
action.227
The Court then considered the two "flawed premises" the Eighth Circuit
relied on in reaching its decision. The first flawed premise discussed by the
Court was that the Limitation Act gives a shipowner the right to seek
exoneration from liability in federal court even when limitation is not at issue." 8
In reasoning against this idea, the Supreme Court stated that the right created by
the Limitation Act limited liability, but did not grant immunity from liability? 9
While the Court agreed with Lewis & Clark that a party seeking limitation is not
required to admit liability to receive the benefit of limitation of liability, it stated
that the Act and the rules promulgated to give it effect did not create a
"freestanding" right to exoneration from liability where liability was not an
issue."3 In the present case, Lewis' stipulation that his claims did not exceed the
value of the vessel and waiver of any defense of res judicata, along with the
district court's stay of the limitation proceeding, protected Lewis & Clark's
rights to try to obtain limitation of any liability it might have."3 The Court noted
that the decision to stay or dismiss a limitation action in order to allow a claimant
to pursue a state court action is within the district court's discretion and that, in
cases where the district court does not believe that the shipowner's right to
limitation will be satisfactorily protected, a district court may maintain the whole
of the case and try it on the merits, both as to issues of liability and limitation.3 2
The district court in the present case, however, because it was convinced that the
shipowner's right to seek limited ability was protected, was "well within" its
discretion in dissolving the injunction to allow Lewis' state court action. 33
The second flawed premise the Supreme Court found that the Eighth Circuit
had relied on was that Lewis had no saved remedy because he had waived his
right to a jury trial in his state court action."3 This premise was flawed,
according to the Court, because the saving to suitors clause preserves for
claimants "all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." 5 The Court
stated that jury trial "is an obvious, but not exclusive, example of the remedies
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 452-53.
229. Id. at 453.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 453-54.
232. Id. at 454.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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available to suitors." 6 The Eighth Circuit had concluded that forum choice was
not a saved remedy because the claimant's action could be removed to federal
court by the vessel owner. 7 The Supreme Court, however, stated that the
possibility that an action might be removed did not limit a claimant's forum
choice under the saving to suitors clause any more than other claimants' forum
choices might be limited?238 The Court explained that it had previously rejected
the notion that admiralty jurisdiction was equivalent to federal question
jurisdiction because it wanted to avoid saving to suitors actions in state courts
being removed to federal court to deny the claimant's forum choice. 9 Defining
admiralty jurisdiction as federal question jurisdiction would, in the Court's
opinion, be a "destructive oversimplification of the highly intricate interplay of
the States and the National Government in their regulation of maritime
commerce." 2' The Court refused to "limit or enumerate" the saved remedies
under the savings clause, recognizing both federal and state courts as proper
forums for considering claims such as Lewis'.24 The Court held that state
courts, with all their remedies, should be allowed to hear claims, so long as the
shipowner's right to limitation of liability was protected, as the Court found it
was in the present case.242
V. COMMENT
Lewis v. Lewis & Clarkwas yet another case involving the conflict between
a jurisdictional grant some two centuries old and a limitation act more than a
century and a half old. Neither has been changed in a significant manner since
its creation. In light of the policies and reasoning expressed in the Court's
Langnes and Lake Tankers decisions, the decision reached by the Court in the
instant case breaks no new ground. Rather than breaking new ground, the Court
has simply towed a drifting Eighth Circuit back into line. Once again, the
Supreme Court has reiterated that courts should strongly favor allowing a
claimant to pursue claims outside the limitation proceeding whenever the
shipowner's right to limitation of liability is protected. As the Court stated some
forty years before the Eighth Circuit's decision in the present case, "[t]he Act is
236. Id. at 454-55.
237. Id. The Eighth Circuit concluded that Lewis' claims could be removed to
federal court by the shipowner if there was an independent basis for jurisdiction in
federal court or transferred by the court under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc. v. Lewis, 196 F.3d 900 (1999), rev'd, 531 U.S. 438 (2001).
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not one of immunity from liability but of limitation of it and we read no other
privilege for the shipowner into its language over and above that granting him
limited liability." 243 The Eighth Circuit's conclusion that shipowners are entitled
in all instances to seek exoneration from liability (i.e., trying the case on its
merits) in federal court2" runs directly contrary to the Supreme Court's directive
and the many cases allowing suitors to pursue their claims outside the limitation
proceeding.45
The Eighth Circuit's conclusion was based on two questionable grounds.
Neither reason is persuasive. The first was that "[b]efore a federal admiralty
court can even address the limitation question in a Limitation Act proceeding,
the court must first determine whether the shipowner is entitled to complete
exoneration... ."' The court cited Universal Towing Co. v. Barrale247 for this
proposition. That case, however, merely states that, in hearing a limitation case,
a district court determines "if a loss occurred; whether there was negligence; if
there was negligence, whether it was without the privity and knowledge of the
owner; and if limitation is granted, how the fund should be distributed."'2" That
portion of Universal Towing did not stand for the idea that a district court must
decide a limitation case on the merits. Rather, the opinion was briefly explaining
how a limitation proceeding works. While it is certainly true that a court will
decide in the first instance whether the shipowner is liable at all, that decision
need not always be made in federal court. Universal Towing, in which the
claimant was allowed to pursue her state court action under the "single claimant"
exception, illustrates the point.
The second source used by the Eighth Circuit to support its decision was
Supplemental Admiralty Rule F. This rule states that a limitation petitioner
"may demand exoneration from as well as limitation of liability."' 9 As the
Supreme Court noted in its opinion, however, this was not intended to create a
"freestanding right to exoneration.., where limitation of liability is not at
issue. ' 20 The Court explained that it determined long ago that a shipowner
could contest liability at the same time that he was seeking limitation of
243. Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1957).
244. See Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc. v. Lewis, 196 F.3d 900, 907-08 (8th Cir.
1999), rev'd, 531 U.S. 438 (2001).
245. The Court noted in Lewis & Clark that requiring in all cases the adjudication
of liability in the first instance in federal court, as the Eighth Circuit's opinion held,
would "expand the scope of the Act." Lewis, 531 U.S. at 453.
246. Lewis, 196 F.3d at 907.
247. 595 F.2d 414, 417 (8th Cir. 1979).
248. Lewis, 196 F.3d at 907 (quoting Universal Towing Co. v. Barrale, 595 F.2d
414, 417 (8th Cir. 1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
249. Lewis, 196 F.3d at 908.
250. Lewis, 531 U.S. at 453.
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liability."I This is contrary to the English practice requiring a shipowner to
confess to liability before seeking limitation. The Court's Lake Tankers
decision, in which the Court noted that in adequate fund cases the need for a
limitation proceeding was completely obviated, exemplifies that where limitation
is not at issue there is no need for the limitation proceeding, including any
determination of exoneration from liability.
What seems to have been clear to the courts before Lewis & Clark, and
what should be abundantly clear now, is that the Limitation of Liability Act is
a cap on a remedy and nothing more. So long as a shipowner is not held liable,
in cases where the owner was lacking privity or knowledge, in excess of the
value of his ship, the purpose of the Act is fulfilled whether a state or federal
court hears the claims at issue. Under the saving to suitors clause, a state court
is a proper forum for inpersonam maritime claims. When a claimant wishes to
pursue an action in state court, and the shipowner's right to limitation is
protected, there is little reason not to allow the state court action to proceed.
It should be noted, however, that shipowners might often have good reason
for preferring to have claims against them adjudicated by a federal court. In
1996, maritime cases comprised only 0.045 percent of the federal docket. 2
Of the ninety-four judicial districts of the United States, nineteen had
no admiralty filings in 1996, thirty-three had ten or fewer, and only ten
had more than a hundred. Admiralty people like to think of the federal
district courts as the nation's admiralty courts .... But it appears that
there may be only about ten real admiralty trial courts, and part-time
ones at that. 53
The expertise, or lack thereof, of the courts in considering admiralty cases has
been the subject of some question. 4 Given the relative infrequency with which
manyfederal judges consider maritime issues, which are in an area traditionally
within their purview, one must wonder whether state judges are even less well-
versed in this area.
Those concerns aside, following Lewis, the relation of the Limitation of
Liability Act to the saving to suitors clause should be clear: When a limitation
act is pending in federal court, and a claimant wishes to pursue an action in state
court, so long as the claimant submits to the necessary stipulations to preserve
251. Id.
252. David W. Robertson, Summertime Sailing and the U.S. Supreme Court: The
Need for a NationalAdmiralty Court, 29 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 275, 276 n.3 (1998).
253. Id. at 276 (footnotes omitted).
25, See e.g., Robertson, supra note 252, suggesting the creation of a national
admiralty court.
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the rights granted to the shipowner by the Limitation of Liability Act, the
claimant should be allowed to pursue the state court action under the saving to
suitors clause.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, the Supreme Court once again made
clear that, under the saving to suitors clause, a claimant should be allowed to
pursue an action in state court so long as the shipowner's right to limit liability
under the Limitation of Liability Act is adequately protected by the federal court.
As the Court has noted, such an outcome protects the rights of both parties. The
Court's ruling breaks no new ground; rather, it reiterates what the Court has been
saying for years. Given the inherent contradictions at work, however, it remains
to be seen whether the longstanding conflict between the saving to suitors clause
and the Limitation of Liability Act is truly settled.
B. MATTHEW STRUBLE
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